constitutes, however, so massive a misunderstanding of my expressed position that one wonders how, or even whether, to reply. I could either berate him for undertaking publicly an 'analysis and criticism' of a thesis that he has manifestly come nowhere near to comprehending, or else I could berate myself for having set forth that thesis without, apparently, making it at all clear. Certainly there has been a radical failure of communication;
and I am left unsure whether the most appropriate might not be simply to weep. Let me attempt a rejoinder, however; even if with heavy heart. One may be allowed to feel that the failure was perhaps not altogether mine, since Wiebe, although focussing on my work, includes in his strictures Bellah's surely lucid and powerful Beyond Belief, and the anthropologist Needham's brilliant Belief, Language, and Experience, so that evidently there is a clash of two ways of envisioning our subject, rather than simply a `naivete' (238; cf. 237) or obtuseness or confusion that 'bedevils' (238) the exposition of one of them. To me, it would seem clear that Wiebe's mind is operating within the confines of a prevalent 'paradigm' (his word, from Kuhn) 'for interpreting the meaning of religious phenomena' specifically to modern-Western philosophy of religion and considers its adequacy or otherwise to interpreting the history of religion-yet this is the one chapter of the work on which Wiebe has nothing to say. It is not even mentioned.
The magnitude of the proposed revision of modern-Westernacademic theories (especially philosophic) about religion is recognized ; and indeed is proffered as a substantial-though admittedly, not a decisive-argument against adopting it, on the grounds that it would require 'costly' (234) rethinking of cherished ways. I found this a trifle amazing, as if Columbus' report of having discovered America were rejected on the grounds that to think in terms of a round world with new continents would involve too troublesome a refashioning of prevailing thought. The fundamental contribution of my book, and the central substance of its argument, is the report of a major empirical discovery. The unexpected, rather monumental, fact is demonstrated, that the words 'belief, 'believing' have drastically changed their meanings since they were used as central religious terms. Wiebe, like everyone else, had obviously been unaware of this previously (as indeed had I); but he does not dispute the painstaking and substantial evidence, nor question the conclusion.
The fact as presented means a radical new awareness for us. I go on then to attempt to digest it; and propound a new way of looking at religious life in the light of this new knowledge. It seems rather pathetic to be told that we should not pay attention to the discovery, since the requisite shift in our established academic outlook would be too demanding.
(There is even a slight suggestion
